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Abstract—Visible light communication (VLC) has been 
recently proposed as an alternative standard to radio-based 
wireless networks. Originally developed as a physical media for 
PANs (Personal area Networks) it evolved into universal WLAN 
technology with a capability to transport internet suite of 
network and application level protocols. Because of its physical 
characteristics, and in line with the slogan "what you see is what 
you send", VLC is considered a secure communication method. 
In this work we focus on security aspects of VLC communication, 
starting from basic physical characteristics of the communication 
channel. We analyze the risks of signal jamming, data snooping 
and data modification. We also discuss MAC-level security 
mechanisms as defined in the IEEE 802.15.7 standard. This 
paper is an extension of work originally reported in Proceedings 
of the 13th IFAC and IEEE Conference on Programmable 
Devices and Embedded Systems — PDES 2015. 
 
Keywords—Wireless networks, visible light communication, 
wireless network security, industrial wireless standards, IEEE 
802.15.7 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ISIBLE light communication (VLC) is a wireless optical 
communication technology through which baseband 
signals are modulated on the light emitted by an LED: [1] – 
[5]. The decreasing cost and hence rapid adaptation of LED-
based light make VLC a promising communication technique 
and a significant alternative to radio-based wireless 
communication. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, etc. - the “traditional” radio 
based communication systems suffer from limited channel 
capacity and transmission rate due to the limited radio 
spectrum available. At the same time the user request for data 
transmission throughput and availability continues to increase. 
VLC data transmission networks provide an attractive 
alternative to traditional wireless techniques.  
Notable differences making VLC systems more attractive 
than radio-based networks are: 
 VLC systems are interface-orthogonal to cellular,  
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and other radio-frequency based 
networks, 
 light does not penetrate solid objects, 
 light can be easily directed through optics, 
 most indoor, and a significant percentage of  outdoor, 
environments are illuminated. 
 VLC was proposed both for in-door and out-door 
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range of communication facilities provided today by Wi-Fi 
networks, Bluetooth and Personal Area Networks (PAN). 
Indoor VLC applications range from: office communication – 
[7], multimedia conferencing – [8], peer-to-peer data 
exchange, data broadcasting – especially multimedia such as 
home-audio and video streams, see: [9] – [12], to positioning: 
[13] – [14]. Currently available commercial VLC systems 
focus mainly on data broadcasting, and include solutions for 
museums, shopping centers, exhibition centers, airports and 
train stations as well as accessibility for disabled persons. 
VLC based positioning systems, for example "smart carts" that 
guide the customers to the shelves according to their list of 
products are already available. VLC systems also provide a 
safe alternative to electromagnetic interference from radio 
frequency communications in hazardous environments, such 
as mines and petrochemical plants, and in applications where 
traditional WLAN communication may interfere with 
specialized equipment, for example in hospitals and in aircraft 
passenger cabins' in-flight entertainment systems (where the 
additional benefit is the reduced weight of cabling and the 
potential for integration with passengers’ own mobile devices) 
[15]. 
The most promising outdoor applications of VLC 
technology are advertising (via LED signboards), pedestrian 
steering (via indicator boards), and road safety and traffic 
management, see [6]. VLC-based positioning and navigation 
provide a viable alternative to GPS in environments where the 
GPS signal is weak or non-existent. As LED headlights and 
taillights in commercially available cars are being introduced, 
street lamps, signage and traffic signals are also moving to 
LED technology, and VLC based vehicle-to-vehicle 
("VANETs" – Vehicle Area Networks) and vehicle-to-
roadside communications have become a reality – [16]. VLC 
also provides a viable solution for short-range 
communications underwater where, due to strong signal 
absorption, RF use is impractical – [17]. In this work we will 
focus only on in-door applications. 
Recently VLC is starting to be considered as a way of 
augmenting or event replacing RF networks, for example 
hOME Gigabit Access project (OMEGA) [18], sponsored by 
European Union developed a wide range of techniques aimed 
at VLC based multimedia networks. The usage of smartphone 
cameras and light sensors brings VLC to the field of mobile 
computing and sensing. In this way VLC has a potential to 
evolve into a general WLAN standard – in [19] with the 
OpenVLC platform the authors have demonstrated that with 
current Software Defined Radio (SDR) toolkits it is relatively 
easy to bring TCP/IP suite to the VLC medium. 
One of the features in which VLC techniques are 
considered superior to traditional radio-based communication 
is security. The directivity, and high obstacle  impermeability 
of optical signals are considered to provide a secure way to  
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transmit data within an indoor environment, making the data 
difficult to intercept from outside. The common slogan 
summarizing VLC security features is: "What You See Is 
What You Send” (WYSIWYS) [20].  
As recent history teaches us, a common mistake in the 
development of novel communications techniques was to 
neglect or downplay the security issues. Such was the case 
with the internet protocol suite - both on the network and, 
application layer), various encryption and authentication 
algorithms and protocols, fiber-optics based networks, and 
more recently – radio-based wireless networks. Currently the 
VLC industry seems to be on the same path again: the 
indubitable "pro-security" physical characteristics of visual 
light communication have steered the developers’ focus away 
from the security track. 
In this paper we address security of VLC communications, 
both from the channel (i.e. information theory) and higher 
level (MAC) perspective. As far as VLC standards are 
concerned, we will refer to the IEEE Standard 802.15.7 [21]; 
however, our discussion should also be relevant to other 
proposed VLC techniques not covered by the current IEEE 
norm. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section II we 
will describe the basis of VLC technology – the mechanisms 
of VLC physical layer. In section III we will discuss how 
security issues could be approached in this communication 
media; we will also analyze which aspects of VLC should be 
put into the focus of security research.  In sections IV and V 
we will discuss (respectively) the security of the physical and 
MAC levels of VLC networks. Section VI summarizes the 
paper and outlines the areas of future research.  
II. THE VLC DATE LINK– AN OVERVIEW 
A VLC physical layer consists of: the transmitter, the 
propagation channel and the receiver. Their properties are as 
follows: 
Transmitter – Two types of white-light LEDs are used in 
solid-state lightning: 1) red-green-blue (RGB) emitters; 2) 
blue-LED on yellow-light emitting phosphorus layer ("single-
chip"). The VLC transmitter may use both types, but the 
second type is more widespread in illumination due to its 
energy efficiency and lower complexity. Different types and 
form factors of LED are employed in various environments: 
high power LEDs or LED arrays are the choice for typical in-
door illumination purposes, while low-power devices are used 
in smart-phones and other mobile appliances. The slow 
response of yellow phosphorus to blue light modulation limits 
its spectral component bandwidth to 2MHz, hence the yellow 
component is filtered- out at the receiver and only the blue 
component is detected, bandwidth of 8 MHz may be attained 
with this simple filtering technique [22]. With simple 
analogue pre-equalization at the transmitter side 40 Mb/s 
throughput may be attained without the use of a blue filter 
[23]. By combining a simple pre- and post-equalization, 75 
Mb/s can be achieved [24].  Data throughput of up to 100-230 
Mb/s has been demonstrated in a single-emitter–single-
receiver scenario and On-Off Keying (OOK) – [25]. Higher 
data rates of about 1 Gb/s are also attainable with more 
advanced modulation techniques such as DMT and OFDM. 
Similar data rates were also attained with arrays of separately 
driven light sources [26].  
The receiver collects and concentrates the incoming light 
on a photo-detecting element. Both imaging and non-imaging 
receivers are used. Photocurrent generated in the detector is 
amplified and fed to the D/A circuitry. Currently in devices 
such as smartphones, tablets, etc., low cost photodiodes or 
typical optical sensors are used as photodetectors for the VLC 
channel. With current technology achieving sufficient photo-
detector sensitivity, the required bandwidth is not a problem 
(the transmitter and channel loss and dispersion are the major 
bandwidth limiting factors). It should be noted that as 
photodetectors work in an Intensity Modulation/Direct 
Detection (IM/DD) regime, they produce a signal proportional 
to the intensity (not the amplitude) of the incident wave: the 
detector works as a squarer. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Classification of links according to LOS/NLOS (line-of-sight) and 
directionality of transmitter and receiver. 
The propagation channel in the case of indoor 
environments communication may be characterized by six 
different link configurations, as originally defined in [27] for 
IR links. The propagation channel requires a direct or indirect 
line-of-sight (LOS) between the transmitter and the receiver.  
The degree of directionality is a second factor determining the 
channel type which is dependent on the source beam-angle 
and detector field of view (FOV). All possible channel 
configurations are show in figure 1. The most common link 
types used by VLC are:  
 (a) directed-LOS – mainly for short range (<1m) mobile-
mobile and fixed-mobile communication and also for 
infrastructure  uplink communications 
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 (e) non-directed LOS – mainly for infrastructure 
downlink 
 (f) non-directed NLOS (dispersed) – mainly for 
infrastructure downlink 
 
In general, in all of the above cases, the propagation channel is 
formed by a number of line-of-sight paths from the transmitter 
to the receiver, and a diffuse channel is formed by light from 
the source reflecting  off  multiple surfaces. The combination 
of the directed and the diffuse channel determine the overall 
power received; hence the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)) and, 
in consequence, the bandwidth of the channel. 
In outdoor environments, directed or dispersed LOS is used; 
in this case light from other sources, both artificial and natural, 
must be taken into account. 
III. SECURITY IN VARIOUS ASPECTS OF VLC 
COMMUNICATION 
Security of VLC communication up-to date has been 
mainly tackled with respect to the physical layer. The idea of 
physical-layer security was introduced by Wyner in his paper 
on the degraded discrete memoryless wiretap channel [28]. 
Secrecy capacity was defined as the maximum rate of reliable 
sender-receiver transmission while the communication is 
completely obscure to the eavesdropper. A single-letter 
characterization of the secrecy capacity of non-degraded, 
wiretap channel was formulated in [29], while the secrecy 
capacity of the Gaussian multiple-input, single-output (MISO) 
and multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel 
was resolved in [30] and [31], respectively. It was shown that 
in case of a Gaussian MISO wiretap channel using zero-
forcing via beamforming the eavesdropper’s reception is 
optimal at asymptotic high Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). 
When the channel state information for the eavesdropper is 
not available artificial noise (a jamming signal) added to the 
transmitted data signal results in an increase of achievable 
secrecy rates - [32] and [33]. In [34] a MIMO approach to 
establishing a secure communication zone has been described 
– the authors proposed to use MIMO technique and beam-
forming (similar to RF Wi-Fi networks) to establish a secure 
channel between the transmitter the receiver located in a 
particular physical location. BER (Bit Error Rate) is 
minimized at the receiver’s location, while it remains 
unacceptable high in the rest of the area. In this way a 
potential eavesdropper physically located some distance from 
the legitimate receiver is unable to properly decode the data. 
This is attained without significant influence on the lighting 
characteristics and is therefore unobservable to the users. 
Similar approach was proposed in [35] using MISO (Multiple 
Input Single Output) technique, together with null-steering 
and artificial noise - an achievable secrecy rate was calculated 
numerically. Similar approach was also proposed and in part 
verified in the real environment in [36]. We will return to 
channel-level security issues with respect to the possibility of 
signal jamming in section IV. 
For the purpose of this work we will consider three classes 
of VLC devices: infrastructure, fixed and mobile. Their 
characteristics are summarized in Table 1. As defined in IEEE 
802.15.7 - three basic MAC topologies are supported by VLC: 
peer-to-peer, star and broadcast. The first is typically used 
between two handheld devices such as smart phones; star 
topology is used as a replacement for Wi-Fi networks; and 
broadcast is used in multimedia applications, advertising 
applications and vehicular networks. Indoor VLC modes are 
summarized on figure 2. 
 
TABLE I 
CLASSES OF VLC DEVICES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
Class /  
attribute 






PC, laptops, other 
desktop appliances 





Yes Both P2P and 
coordinator based 





Ample Limited Moderate 
Form factor Unconstrained Constrained Critically-
constrained 
Light source Intense Weak – moderate Weak 
Mobility No No Yes 
Source 
dispersion 
High (ambient) moderate moderate 




Star, broadcast P2P, 
broadcast and 






Fig. 2. Indoor VLC modes 
We will consider four basic aspects of VLC communication 
security, namely: availability, confidentiality, authenticity, and 
integrity with respect to infrastructure, fixed and mobile 
classes of VLC devices. The threats that we consider are the 
possibilities of: jamming, snooping and data modification. 
Each threat should be considered separately for all 
communication schemes, i.e. mobile-to-mobile, infrastructure-
to-mobile, mobile-to-infrastructure, etc. Intuitively we know 
that, for example it is easier to eavesdrop on infrastructure-to-
mobile communication than on mobile-to-mobile, but some 
sort of risk assessment associated with each communication 
scheme should provide us with an answer about the areas of 
highest threat level. 
We will use qualitative threat characteristics: “low”, 
“medium” and “high” based on the communication scheme’s 
10   G. J. BLINOWSKI 
 
 
physical characteristics. Figure 3 shows qualitative 
estimations of: range, power and radiation angle for each 
communication scheme. In regard to range, mobile-to-mobile 
range is considered "low" (~ 10 cm), "medium" (up to 1 m) 
applies to fixed-to-fixed and fixed-to-mobile, and all 
communications with infrastructure are considered to have 
"high" range (up to 3 m). Power is "low" for mobile devices, 
"medium" for fixed, and "high" when infrastructure is the 
sender. The radiation semi angle is typically 20 to 45 degrees 
for mobile and fixed devices; when infrastructure ambient 
lighting is used we consider the angle to be "high" (typically 
60 degrees or more). Narrow radiation angles which may be 
achieved with laser or highly focused transmitter optics are 
not currently popular and will not be considered. 
 
I 3 3 -  I 1 2 - 
F 2 2 3  F 1 2 3 
M 1 2 3  M 1 2 3 
R/S M F I  R/S M F I 
Range (R)          Power (P) 
 
I 2 2 - 
F 2 2 3 
M 2 2 3 
R/S M F I 
Radiation semi-angle (A) 
Fig. 3. Qualitative classification of (R) data transmission range, (P) Power 
and (A) Radiation Angle for communication between: mobile, fixed and 
infrastructure devices. Senders are grouped by columns, receivers by rows. 
We define the risks of jamming, snooping and data 
modification as follows: 
 
Jamming:     J = R / P               (1) 
 
Snooping:     S = P * A                                  (2) 
 
Data modification: M = J * S = R * A                    (3) 
 
Jamming (1) is directly proportional to range – the longer 
the range, the easier to introduce a concealed transmitting 
device, this feature being inversely proportional to the 
transmission power. Snooping (2) is directly proportional to 
transmission power and the radiation angle – the wider and 
more powerful the transmission beam, the easier to oversee 
the communication. Data modification risk (3) is estimated as 
a product of the risks of jamming and snooping.  The 
calculated risks are shown in figure 4. 
IV. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY 
The risk estimation results are consistent with intuition: the 
greatest risk of violating VLC security arises when 
communication with infrastructure is concerned. In the 
following sections of this paper we will focus on indoor 
infrastructure downlink communication security. We should 
therefore focus mainly on this aspect of communication.  
Transmission snooping  
The IEEE 802.15.7 standard states that "Because of 
directionality and visibility, if an unauthorized receiver is in 
the path of the communication signal, it can be recognized." 
However, this is not always true: when communication with 
the infrastructure is concerned both in the case of the NLOS 
channel and LOS, an unauthorized receiver may be easily 
introduced into the environment without being recognized. 
 Snooping on VLC transmission is of course limited by 
physical factors, and is more difficult than Wi-Fi snooping, 





Fig. 4. Qualitative estimation of risk of: jamming, snooping and data 
modification of communication between: mobile (M), fixed (F) and 
infrastructure (I) devices. Sender are grouped by columns, receivers by rows. 
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it was shown experimentally that eavesdropping on VLC 
transmission is indeed possible. The equipment used based on 
a standard low-cost SDR design was able to achieve 
acceptable BER rates in a range of different scenarios. The 
authors evaluated different room configurations and were able 
to decode high-order modulated 64-QAM VLC signals outside 
of the room – via door-gaps, key holes and windows protected 
by special “privacy” coatings. 
Transmission jamming and data modification 
What are the possible schemes for introducing a signal 
jamming or data-modifying device into the VLC infrastructure 
channel? The attacker may choose to use both directed and 
non-directed light sources in the LOS or NLOS models, but 
due to power considerations a LOS model will be preferred. In 
general, the attacker's aim is to achieve a higher illumination 
at the receiver than that provided by the transmitter. One 
possible way of achieving this goal may be to use optical 
beamforming.  
The major practical factor from the attacker's point of view 
is to ensure that the illumination provided by the rogue 
transmitter remains undetected by users. Hence, the attacker 
may use a highly directed transmitter. VLC infrastructure 
networks may consist of numerous independent transmitters to 
provide adequate coverage and capacity. Multi-transmitter 
"femtocell" VLC networks are also studied as an extension to 
traditional Wi-Fi and cellular networks – see [38]. In such 
environments the installation of a rogue transmitter may easily 
pass undetected. A second possibility is hijacking a part of the 
legitimate VLC infrastructure via wired or wireless channel; in 
a large installation such malicious intervention may also pass 
undetected.  
Data modification in VLC networks may be attained by 
reactive jamming techniques. As was demonstrated in [39], 
real time reactive jamming is easily in reach of attackers with 
the use of SDR technology. In the above mentioned work, 
ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4) protocol devices were used – it is 
worth noting the MAC-level similarities of ZigBee and the 
VLC 802.15.7 standard. 
What are the possible schemes for introducing a signal 
jamming into the VLC infrastructure channel? The attacker 
may choose to use LOS or NLOS models, but due to power 
considerations a LOS model will be preferred. In general, the 
attacker's aim is to achieve a higher illumination at the 
receiver than that provided by the transmitter.  
Let us consider this possibility in more detail. An optical 
communication link is modelled as a Poisson channel. The 
input to the Poisson channel is a non-negative waveform (t). 
The output of the channel is an inhomogeneous Poisson 
process with intensity (t) + 0. The second term represents 
the additive Poisson noise of intensity 0.  
In the MAC model introduced in [40] there are K 
independent inputs and one output. The channel output is a 
superposition of the outputs of K independent single-user 
Poisson channels.  Hence, for inputs (t); (t); ... K(t)  the 
output of the  channel is an inhomogeneous Poisson process 






)()(                  (5) 
In the general case of K transmitters, it was shown in [40] that 
the maximum total throughput of the Poisson MAC 
monotonically increases with the number of transmitters and is 
bounded from above (this is in contrast to the Gaussian MAC, 
where the maximum total throughput grows unbounded as the log 
of the number of transmitters).  The Poisson MAC has a capacity 
achieving output which is a Poisson process with an intensity L 
equal to the sum of its K binary inputs. A Poisson process of 
intensity  has the entropy rate  (1-log() ) bits/sec. – it does not 
monotonically increase with the input, and is concave with a peak 
at input intensity 1/e. Therefore, adding more inputs to a Poisson 
MAC eventually saturates the entropy rate (and hence the 
information content) of the output.  
The consequences of the above, as far as signal jamming is 
concerned, are as follows: given the channel capacity limitation, a 
signal source with sufficient transmitting power will be able to 
saturate the channel obscuring the data source; the same result 
may also be obtained by a larger number of rogue low-power 
transmitters. 
The major practical factor from the attacker's point of view 
is to ensure that the illumination provided by the rogue 
transmitter remains undetected by users. Hence, the attacker 
may use a highly directed transmitter. VLC infrastructure 
networks typically consist of numerous independent 
transmitters to provide adequate coverage and capacity. Multi-
transmitter "femtocell" VLC networks are also studied as an 
extension to traditional Wi-Fi and cellular networks – see [38] 
In such environments the installation of a rogue transmitter 
may easily pass undetected. Another possible way of effective 
jamming may be to use optical beamforming. Similar to 
beamforming in WLAN optical beamforming may be attained 
by focusing light emitted from multiple LEDs. Optical 
beamforming in VLC was also demonstrated in practice with a 
solid-state spatial light modulator [41]. Limited amount of 
research was done towards optical beamforming, however it 
was demonstrated [42] that significant SNR improvements can 
be achieved by this means – hence it is also a viable jamming 
technique. A third possibility is hijacking a part of the 
legitimate VLC infrastructure via wired or wireless channel; in 
a large installation such malicious intervention may also pass 
undetected.   
V.  MAC LAYER SECURITY 
What is the current state of security of the standardized VLC 
protocol? IEEE standard 802.15.7 defines the security 
mechanisms to be carried out by the MAC sublayer when 
requested by the higher protocol levels. The major assumption of 
the current IEEE standard is that data confidentiality and integrity 
should be provided by cryptographical means, but the 
implementation of these services should not be unnecessarily 
complicated and should not consume too many computational 
resources. This assumption aligns with the PAN (personal area 
networks) and BAN (body area networks) paradigm within which 
the computing resources may have significantly limited 
capabilities in terms of computing power, available storage, and 
power drain.  However, VLC networks are also considered as a 
LAN technology (or at least as an LAN augmentation); hence the 
currently proposed security mechanisms may prove to be too 
weak.  
The cryptographic mechanism of the IEEE 802.15.7 standard 
is based on symmetric-key cryptography and uses keys that are 
provided by higher layer processes. Cryptographic frame 
protection uses a key shared between two peer devices (link key) 
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or a key shared among a group of devices (group key), thus 
allowing some flexibility and application-specific trade-off 
between key storage and key maintenance costs versus the 
cryptographic protection provided. The standard defines 8 
security levels:  
 "None" (no encryption and no integrity), 
 integrity-only provided by the MIC-32, MIC-64 and 
MIC-128 algorithms (three levels),  
 encryption-only, and:  
 encryption plus MIC (the three aforementioned 
variants).  
Encryption uses the CCM* algorithm based on 128 bit AES 
in CBC-MAC mode. The optional key frame counter 
mechanism forces key initialization and prevents replay 
attacks. Frame encryption is provided for data, beacon payload 
and command payload. The standard itself does not define 
higher-level aspects of key generation, retrieval and 
management– these are explicitly identified as outside the 
standard’s scope. This approach carries the following risks: 
 As security services provided by integrity and 
encryption are optional,  there is a large risk that in 
practical applications security will be turned off by 
default or not implemented at all, 
 some of the MAC header fields are not encrypted, 
which may lead to attacks already known and 
described for Wi-Fi (802.11) networks, 
 the standard does not define protection of the keying 
material or the distribution of keys (as, for example, 
802.15.4 does) 
 If a group key is used for peer-to-peer 
communication, protection is provided only against 
outsider devices and not against potential malicious 
devices in the key-sharing group. 
VI. SUMMARY 
VLC is one of the promising wireless communication 
technologies of the future, therefore improving its 
transmission security is highly desirable. Today, most of the 
research in VLC has focused on physical and MAC layer 
performance enhancements, while security remains in large 
yet to be addressed. In this paper, we have conducted a risk 
assessment of VLC communication with respect to the 
communicating parties of three basic classes: mobile, fixed 
and infrastructure. We have shown that particularly in case of 
infrastructure downlink communication security with respect 
to data snooping, communication jamming and data 
modification must be emphasized. Analyzing basic physical 
characteristics of the VLC communication channel we can 
came to the conclusion that signal jamming and modification 
is possible in real world VLC applications; while the MAC 
layer, as currently defined in IEEE 802.15.7 does not provide 
adequate protection against those risks. In future research we 
plan to examine such issues as:  multi-user and multiple-
eavesdropper scenarios, security with respect to user mobility 
and anti-jamming techniques. 
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